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RECENT CASES
AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE: RESCISSION OF ASSIGNED RISK COVERAGE AFTER ACCIDENT-An insurer in Virginia may cancel ab initio
a voluntary Assigned Risk (poor risk) for fraud and
misrepresentation in the procurement of the policy, even
after the accident has occurred. Virginia Farm Bureau
Mutual Insurance Company v. Saccio, 204 Va. 769, 133
S. E. 2d 268 (1963).
On the surface, this case seems to weaken the purpose
sought to be achieved in enacting the Safety Responsibility Law as set out in Va. Code Ann. §46.1-388 to
46.1-514 (Repl. Vol. 1958).
Mass production made it possible for many people to
own automobiles. Some of these persons were totally unable to secure insurance coverage, though they desired
to do so. The companies did not want them as insurance
risks. The several states tried to find a way to protect
the innocent victim of a financially irresponsible motorist, and Virginia came up with the Safety Responsibility
Law. This required all policies to carry certain minimum
limits of coverage and to be uniform in application to an
accident. This was not compulsory and vast numbers
were still unable to obtain coverage.
Out of this grew the Virginia Automobile Assigned
Risk Plan, which was designed to distribute these risks
equitably among the companies operating in Virginia.
It was authorized by the Virginia Legislature in Va.
Code Ann. §38.1-264 (Repl. Vol. 1953). One who could not
secure coverage otherwise may apply through the Plan
and be assigned to a company. It was purely voluntary
between the companies, but for it to be operative, all companies in Virginia had to agree to it. Once operative, it
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became compulsory on each company to accept the risks
assigned to it.
Section 18 of the Plan provides for cancellation by the
insurer. This requires the insurer to give ten days notice to the manager of the Plan before the effective date
of the cancellation. It would seem that this provision
would provide only for prospective cancellation by the
insurer.
Even with this Plan, many people were still uninsured.
Thus Va. Code Ann. §46.1-497 (Repl. Vol. 1958), was
enacted, setting up the Statutory Assigned Risks. Here
if one fails to secure coverage otherwise, he may apply
to the State Corporation Commission and be assigned to
a company. This is compulsory on the companies and if
a risk is assigned, they must accept and certify that a
policy is in force and applicable to future accidents as
set forth in Va. Code Ann. §46.1-471 (Repl. Vol. 1958).
A company also may be required to certify under certain
other conditions, but if certification is made and an accident occurs, the company's liability becomes absolute
as to that accident.
It is easily seen that the trend has been to provide insurance for all persons using the highways. Along this
line, the court in this case recognizes the different classes
of risks as "desirable," "poor," and "statntory." This
is significant both to the insurer and the insured, in determining their compliance with the Safety Responsibility Laws and their position after the accident has occurred.
The latest case arising in Virginia dealing with rescission of an automobile policy for fraud was State Farm
Insurance Company v. Butler, 203 Va. 575, 125 S. E. 2d
823, decided in 1962. This case held, as applied to a "desirable" risk, that the insurer could cancel the policy
ab initio for fraud and misrepresentation even after the
accident had occurred. See also Burruss v. NrationalLife
Assn., 96 Va. 543, 32 S. E. 49 (1899); Life Insurance
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Company of Virginia v. Hairston, 108 Va. 832, 62 S. E.
1057 (1908); Sterling InsuraInce Company v. Dansey, 195
Va. 933, 81 S. E. 2d 446 (1954).
In the Saccio case, Miss Saccio was injured as a result
of an accident with one Smith who had procured his insurance coverage through the Virginia Automobile Assigned Risk Plan and would be termed a voluntary Assigned Risk. (Poor Risk). In the investigation after the
accident, the company determined that Smith had misrepresented certain facts that would have rendered him
ineligible for insurance had they been truthfully disclosed. Following the investigation, the company disclaimed liability under the policy, cancelled it ab initio,
and returned the full premium to Smith.
Miss Saccio then secured a judgment and had execution
issued against Smith which was returned unsatisfied. She
then proceeded against the Virginia Farm Bureau
Mutual Insurance Company under conditions in the
policy that would let her reach any indemnity due the
insured. The compelling questions to be decided were
whether the voluntary Assigned Risk Plan was compulsory on the carriers and whether Section 18 of the Plan
provided only for prospective cancellation by the carrier
giving ten days notice to the manager of the Plan. And
finally, whether the companies by subscribing to the Plan
gave up their rights to rescind the policy on the basis
of fraud and misrepresentation after the accident had
occurred.
The only case cited in support of Miss Saccio 's position, and the only one the writer has been able to find
dealing with a voluntary Assigned Risk similar to the
Virginia Plan is, Aetna Casualty and Surety Company
v. O'Connor,8 N. Y. 2d 359, 207 N.Y.S. 2d 679, 170 N.E.
2d 681 (1960). In this case, the Plan was set up by the
Superintendent of Insurance for the State of New York
under legislative authority. All the companies were required to participate in The Plan and it was administered
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by the Superintendent of Insurance. Aetna insured
O'Connor under this Plan, made an investigation as to
his prior driving record and failed to uncover any misrepresentations made. In an investigation after the accident, the fraud was discovered and Aetna attempted to
cancel ab initio.
The New York court held that their Assigned Risk
Plan abrogated the insurer's common law right to avoid
a policy ab ihtio on the basis of fraud. The New York
Legislature had taken this means of assuring coverage to
persons who could not get it in the usual channels. After
the accident had occurred, the company's liability was
therefore absolute.
Our court, in the Saceio case, did not follow the Aetna
case and held that the legislature in Va. Code Ann
§38.1-264 (Repl. Vol. 1953) did not abrogate the Butler
rule and neither did the companies do so when they
voluntarily adopted the Plan and provided for prospective cancellation. The Virginia statute merely permits the
companies to set up the Plan and does not require them
to do so as was done in the New York case. Virginia
has two types of Assigned Risks, voluntary under the
Plan and statutory under Va. Code Ann. §46.1-497 (Repl.
Vol. 1958), and the certification statutes. The court
further held that neither did the companies, in adopting
Section 18 of the Plan, abrogate the common law rule,
as the purpose of the Plan was to make liability insurance available to the "poor risks," subject to the conditions of the Plan as regards the equitable distribution
among the companies. The provision in Section 18 as to
ten days notice was simply to keep the manager of the
Plan informed and prevent the companies from cancelling a "poor risk" without adequate reason. Section 18
does not restrict the companies as to rescission for fraud
in the procurement of the policy.
The Butler rule now applies to "desirable risks" and
to "poor risks" in Virginia.
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The distinction drawn by our court between the Saccio
ease and the Aetna case is that in Virginia the voluntary
Plan under Va. Code Ann. §38.1-264 (Repl. Vol. 1953)
is permissive, and in the Aetna case the New York
statute was compulsory. This seems to be a very technical distinction, as actually the only choice the companies had under the Virginia statute was whether or
not to adopt the Plan. Once it was adopted, each company
must take its proportionate share of the risks assigned.
What if the companies had elected not to adopt the
Plan? It seems doubtful that they would have had any
choice in whether they would accept the "poor risks"
because instead of having two types of assigned risks,
as we have today, there would only be the statutory assigned risks under the Code. All "poor risks" would
have ultimately been assigned to the companies anyway
if the ones who wanted coverage could not procure it
through the regular chaunnels. Then it does not appear
that the Virginia companies actually had any more choice
in whether they accepted the risk than did the New York
companies, but they were permitted to set up the method
of distributing the risks in Virginia.
It is submitted, however, that the Virginia decision is
sound when considered in the light of the purpose sought
to be achieved by the legislature in passing the Safety
Responsibility Act. That purpose is to afford a means
of recovery for the innocent victim of the financially
irresponsible motorist using our highways. Virginia also
has an Uninsured Motorist Act, Va. Code Ann. §38.1-381
(Supp. 1962). Space will not permit a thorough discussion of this, but it is a part of each automobile liability
policy issued in Virginia and applies when the insured
suffers loss or injury as a result of an uninsured liability.
One is uninsured if he does not have a policy, or if he has
a policy, but the insurer disclaims liability thereunder for
any reason.
When the Safety Responsibility Act and the Uninsured
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Motorist Act are considered together, an insurer can still
retain its common law defenses against fraud and misrepresentation, to prevent the wrongdoer from profiting
by his wrong at the expense of the insurer and ultimately
the premium paying public. Under the Uninsured Motorist Coverage, there would still be a redress to the innocent victim for his loss.
One other distinction could be drawn between the
Aetna case and the Virginia case, but neither court
seemed to attach much significance to this point. It is to
be noted that Aetna investigated O'Connor before the
accident occurred and had ample time to determine
whether any misrepresentations had, in fact, been made
that would be material to the risk. Then it could be
argued that Aetna did not rely on the statements as made
by O'Connor and relied on its own investigation. These
facts were not present in the Virginia case and should
strengthen the Virginia decision.
EDWARD H. ROUNTREE

PROPERTY: TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY IN
PERSONALTY-On October 14, 1954, Willis Lee Oliver
and his wife, Betty H. Oliver, brought realty in Laurel
Glen, Henrico -County, Virginia, taking title thereto as
tenants by the entireties with survivorship as at common
law. On February 23, 1959, the Olivers entered into a
contract to sell this property and the closing took place
May 29, 1959. The proceeds from this sale were made
payable to Betty H. Oliver and they were deposited in
her name.
On May 17, 1960, Willis Lee Oliver and his brother,
partners in an electrical business, filed voluntary petitions in bankruptcy and were adjudicated bankrupts.
Subsequently, Charles W. Givens Jr. was .appointed
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trustee in bankruptcy. The trustee filed a Motion for
Judgment against Betty H. Oliver in the Circuit Court
of Hanover County to recover one-half of the net proceeds from the sale of the Laurel Glen property. The
trial court held that the tenancy by the entirety had been
terminated by the sale, and that the Olivers became tenants in common of the proceeds. Following this line of
reasoning it was inevitable that the trial court find that
the trustee was entitled to a judgment equal to one-half
the net proceeds of the sale. Being tenants in common of
the proceeds, Willis Oliver's share was subject to his
debts, and the transfer of all the funds to his wife could
be set aside as a fraudulent conveyance. This decision
was appealed and the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Oliver v. Givens, Trustee, 204 Va. 123, 129 S. E.
2d 661 (1963), reversed the trial court, and entered final
judgment in favor of the appellant, Mrs. Oliver.
In reaching its decision the court said that the proceeds of the sale were held not as tenants in common, but
by the entireties. Once this had been decided the court
had ample authority for holding that there had been no
conveyance in fraud of creditors. In Vasilion v. Vasilion,
192 Va. 735, 66 S. E. 2d 599 (1951), the Virginia Court
of Appeals held that a conveyance of realty, owned by
a wife and her husband as tenants by the entireties, to
the wife solely, was not in fraud of creditors. This case
is controlling once the court found that the Olivers owned
the proceeds by the entireties. Surprisingly enough, until Oliver v. Givens the Virginia Court of Appeals had
not dealt with the problem of whether personalty could
be owned by the entireties.
There is a difference of opinion -among other states
which have decided this issue. The majority of jurisdictions hold that personalty can be owned by the entireties.
See Annot., 64 A.L.R. 2d 8 (1959). Nevertheless there is
a strong minority which holds contra. Among these states
are Indiana, New York, New Jersey, Michigan, and
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North Carolina. This writer, after reading a considerable cross section of these cases, fried to ascertain the
reasons for states differing on this point. The statement
most often encountered in the opinions from the majority
jurisdictions is to the effect that the one obstacle to the
existence of tenancies by the entireties in personalty
has been removed by the Married Women's Acts. At
common law the husband became the owner of all of his
wife's personalty, and also had the power to reduce her
choses in action to possession. As long as this were true
there would be no ownership by the entirety in personalty, the husband being the sole owner. However,
when the Married Women's Acts removed this disability
there remained no reason why husband and wife could
not own personalty by the entireties, since they may be
considered as one person. These states seem to have
adopted the attitude, that we shall hold personalty
can be owned by the entireties because no one has shown
us a reason why it should not be so owned.
Other states are convinced that entirety ownership
must be confined to realty. One Oregon case uses as its
authority a definition from Blackstone's Commentaries.
In Stout v. Van Zante, 109 Ore. 430, 219 Pac. 804 (1923),
the Oregon Court said:
"In this state it has never been held that estates
by the entirety exist in personal property, and,
under the definition of estates by the entirety given
by Blackstone, they were confined and restricted to
estates in fee given to a man and his wife, which
definition excludes personal property from the
operation of the rule." 219 Pac. at 807.
There is also a feeling among authorities that such a
rule opens the door to a legalized defrauding of creditors.
It is contended that a person could take his assets and
purchase stocks and bonds in the name of husband and
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wife as tenants by the entirety and thereby immunize
the property from all future creditors, except joint
creditors of the husband and wife. There seems, to this
writer, to be some merit in this concern. Nevertheless,
the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has, from all
appearances, joined wholeheartedly with the majority
decisions. The court's feeling has caused it to say considerably more than necessary on the facts of the Oliver
case.
The only issue before the court in Oliver, concerned
the proceeds derived from the sale of realty which was
owned by the entireties. As the court said:
"The determination of this issue turns upon
whether the proceeds of the sale of the Laurel Glen
property, which the husband and wife owned as tenants by the entireties, were owned by them as tenants in common or as tenants by the entireties." 204
Va. at 125. (Emphasis supplied.)
The assignments of error listed by the appellant,
Oliver, concerned the lower court's ruling, which dealt
only with the proceeds of the sale of realty owned by
the entireties.
Yet, note carefully the language of the appellate court:
"While the question has not been previously presented to this court, we agree with the reasoning of
the majority view and hold that in this State personal property as well as realty may be held by a
husband and wife as tenants by the entireties." 204
Va. at 126. (Emphasis supplied.)
The court in this sweeping statement has not confined
its "holding" to the issues before the court. It has said
that any personalty can be owned by the entireties, not
solely the proceeds derived from the sale of realty so
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owned. Thus, the court would seem to be stating a broader rule than necessary to dispose of the present controversy.
The court goes on to say that in those jurisdictions
recognizing tenancy by the entirety in personal property, it is almost universally held, in absence of an agreement or understanding to the contrary, that the proceeds
derived from a voluntary sale of real estate held by entireties are likewise held by the entireties. While there
is considerable authority for this proposition it does not
necessarily follow that all states who hold that proceeds
of entirety owned realty are to be owned by the entirety,
also hold that all personalty can be owned by entireties.
For example in Koehring v. Bown", 194 Ind. 433, 142
N. E. 117 (1924), the court said:
"Estates by entireties do not exist as to personal
property [citation omitted] except when such property is directly derived from real estate held by that
title, as crops produced by the cultivation of lands
owned by entireties or proceeds arising from the
sale of property so held." 142 N. E. at 118. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Virginia Court lists a, decision by Judge Walter
E. Hoffman of the United States District Court of the
Eastern District of Virginia, Moore v. Glatzbach, 188
F. Supp. 267 (E.D. Va. 1960), as being in accord. But
that case cannot enlarge the scope of the Oliver case as
it also dealt with proceeds of land (rent) owned by the
entireties. The Moore case does present some interesting
observations from which it might be inferred that Virginia does recognize tenancies by the entireties in personalty.
A fair interpretation of the present Virginia situation
is that while it has not actually been held on the facts
that all personalty can be owned as tenants by the en-
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tireties, should a case arise presenting that issue, the
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals would so hold.
JOHN PAGE RAWLINGS

DOMESTIC RELATIONS: JURISDICTION-Section
20-98 of the Code of Virginia in referring to "county or
corporation in which the parties last cohabited" as
jurisdiction for divorce proceedings does not mean last
place of mere copulation. Colley v. Colley, 204 Va. 225,
129 S.E. 2d 630 (1963).
This suit was brought by complainant in the Circuit
Court of Prince William County against her husband
for divorce. From August, 1956 to December 21, 1960,
the parties had lived together as husband and wife in
Prince William County. In December, 1960, defendant
decided that they would go to the home of his parents in
Louisa County, Virginia, for the Christmas holidays and
stay there until the first of the following month and then
return to Prince William County. The only preparations
made were those normally incidental to a visit, and
nothing suggested any permanency to the trip. During
the course of the visit a quarrel between the parties ensued, whereupon complainant left and returned to Prince
William without the defendant. The complainant testified
that the last time she had sexual relations with her husband was in January, 1961 in Louisa County.
The pertinent part of Va. Code Ann. §20-98 (Repl.
Vol. 1960), provides that suit for divorce shall be brought
in the county in which the parties last cohabited. Defendant contended that the parties last cohabited, within the meaning of the statute, in Louisa County since
that was the last place of copulation. And consequently,
he contended that the Circuit Court of Prince William
County lacked potential jurisdiction of the suit.
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Defendant based his argument upon two Virginia cases
in which the court had construed the word "cohabit" in
other statutes as meaning "copulate." See, Martin v.
Commonwealth, 195 Va. 1107, 81 S. E. 2d 574 (1954);
Tarr v. Tarr, 184 Va. 443, 35 S. E. 2d 401 (1945). The
court, in the Colley case, noted that different statutes
were involved in these earlier decisions and held that the
last place of cohabitation, within the meaning of §20-98
of the Virginia Code, was not Louisa County.
The problem before the court was the interpretation
or definition to be given the word "cohabit." In the
Martin v. Commonwealth and Tarr v. Tarr cases supra,
the legal or popular meaning had been adopted. However, the former case involved §18-97 [§18.1-206 Va. Code
Ann. (Repl. Vol. 1960)], making it a felony for any person to receive money for procuring any female for the
purpose of causing her to "cohabit" with any male person.: The court stated that the word "cohabit" meant
the having of illegal sexual intercourse. Clearly, the
case is correct, but it is unfortunate that the statute uses
the term "cohabit." The case of Tarr v. Tarr involved
Va. Code Ann. §20-94 (Repl. Vol. 1960), which deals
with the effect of cohabitation after knowledge of adultery. In this case, the court construed the word "cohabit" to mean copulation. Thus, two prior decisions
handed down by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals have defined the word "cohabit" as meaning copulation. It would seem that the popular definition had thus
been adopted in Virginia.
But in the instant case the court rejected this popular
definition of "cohabit." The court, in effect, recognized
that the word is not one of certain meaning. The acquired meaning varies necessarily with the connection
in which the word is used.
The meaning of "cohabit" must involve copulation in
dealing with the felony prohibited in §18.1-206 or the
condonation implied in §20-94, since public policy pre-
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eludes the giving of relief to persons who have offended
either statute. In §18.1-206 of the Virginia Code, the term
"cohabit" necessarily means copulation or sexual intercourse since there would be no offense otherwise. Obviously there is no public need to prevent any male and
female from residing together if no illicit intercourse is
involved. As stated in Martin v. Commnonwealth, supra,
"The whole tenor of §18-97 [§18.1-206 (Repl. Vol. 1960),
supra] is to prohibit illicit and commercial prostitution
and procurement." 195 Va. at 1109. Tarr v. Tarr, supra,
ably expressed the policy behind §20-94 when the court
there referred to Herrman v. Herrman,93 Misc. 315, 156
N.Y.S. 688, 690 (1916) and quoted from that opinion:
"No one would be heard to contend for a moment
that a husband in an action for absolute divorce
should be entitled to a decree where it appeared
that he admitted having sexual intercourse with his
wife after his discovery of her adultery."
The court in Tarr v. Tarr,su'pra, continued:
"It would be shocking to the moral sense for a
court of equity to grant a divorce to parties who,
during the pendency of the suit, litigated by day
and copulated by night." 184 Va. at 448, 449.
There is no such public policy in a statute giving jurisdiction to a court, since the purpose of this statute as
stated in Jenniiqs v. McDougle, 83 W. Va. 186, 98 S. E.
162 (1919), involving a similar West Virginia statute, is
"... to save the plaintiff the embarrassment, annoyance, and expense necessarily incident to the
pursuit of a resident defendant, should he or she
abandon or desert the other or otherwise disregard
the marriage vows or duties and depart from the
county where they last cohabited." 98 S. E. at 163.
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Therefore, Justice Buchanan, in delivering the opinion
of the court, referred to the case of Richardson v. Richardson, 8 Va. Law Reg., N.S. 257 (1922), decided in the
Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond and accepted the literal definition of "cohabit" as espoused
by that court. There, Judge Crump held that cohabitation in its proper meaning in the law of divorce has reference to a continuing condition and not to an act.
The logical and proper result was reached by the
court in the principal case when it said:
"To hold that 'last cohabited' as used in this
statute means 'last copulated' would result in giving jurisdiction in any county or corporation where
the parties last had sexual relations, regardless of
the time or purpose of their being in that place. It
is not to be supposed that the legislature intended
such result." 204 Va. at 228.
Anticipating the definition which will be given the
term "cohabit" in various contexts will be difficult for
the Virginia practitioner since the word is so frequently
used in the statutes. With reference to jurisdictional
statutes it seems safe to assume that the court will follow the definition in the principal case. Although Colley
v. Colley solves the problem in this particular situation,
unless the Virginia Legislature chooses to provide definitions in the future, lawyers in Virginia will be faced
with the problem that ambiguities always precipitate.
PAuL

S. BARBEY AND ROBERT F. BROOKS

116

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW NOTES

PROCEDURE: SERVICE OF PROCESS AT USUAL
PLACE OF ABODE-The permanent residence of defendant remains his "usual place of abode" for substituted service of process although defendant has left
for a vacation of two months. Spiegelma v. Birch, 204
Va. 96, 129 S. E. 2d 119 (1963).
The sheriff's return stated that on October 20, 1960,
he served a copy of the Motion for Judgment on defendant by posting it at the front door of defendant's "usual
place of abode," neither defendant nor a member of his
family over sixteen years of age being found there.
This return met all -he requirements for substituted service as set forth in Va. Code Ann. §8-51 (Repl. Vol. 1957).
Defendant proved that he had left Virginia on September
5, 1960, for a vacation in Florida and had not returned
to Virginia until November 5, 1960. He argued that
during this 60-day period, his Virginia home was not his
"usual place of abode" within the meaning of the statute. The Supreme Court of Appeals ruled that since defendant was only temporarily absent from his Virginia
residence, it remained his "usual place of abode" during the entire period of his vacation.
This appears to be the first case to reach the Supreme
Court of Appeals on the question of whether defendant's
home remains his "usual place of abode" while he is
temporarily residing elsewhere. Although we now know
that two months of temporary residence away from home
does not change the status of the home as defendant's
"usual place of abode," many questions remain unanswered. For example, how long can defendant remain
away from home and continue to be only temporarily
absent? Is defendant's temporary residence also his
"usual place of abode"? What is defendant's "usual
place of abode" if he lives three days a week in one home
and four days in another? Where is the "usual place of
abode" if defendant is a migratory worker?
Besides Spiegelman, there is only one other case inter-
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preting Virginia law on this issue. That case, Earle v.
MoVeigh, 91 U. S. 503 (1876), reached the United States
Supreme Court on facts similar to those in Spiegelma"
and involved the interpretation of a Virginia statute
which was the prototype of the present Section 8-51 of
the Virginia Code. In that case a copy of the process
was posted at the front door of the house which defendant had abandoned to seek refuge behind the lines of the
retreating Confederate Army during the Civil War. Defendant intended to return home only after the cessation
of hostilities. The Supreme Court held that defendant's
Virginia home was not his "usual place of abode." The
Court defined "usual place of abode" as "then present
residence. "I
The decision in McVeigh does not seem in conflict with
Spiegelman as the continuation of the Civil War might
have prevented defendant's return to his Virginia home
for years. But the MeVeigh definition of "usual place
of abode" does see into involve a difference in interpretation of the Virginia statute. If the MoVeigb definition of "then present residence" had been followed in
the Spiegelman case, defendant's temporary residence in
Florida, not his Virginia home, would have been defendant's "usual place of abode."
A survey of cases in other states and in the Federal
courts offers little in the determination of a clear-cut
definition of the "usual place of abode" when defendant
is temporarily residing away from his permanent home.
The authorities are in hopeless confusion, but the weight
of authority is that the permanent home remains the
"usual place of abode." In Rask v. American Federation
of Labor, 263 inn. 198, 116 N. W. 2d 175 (1962), defendant, who lived in New York, visited his daughter in
Minnesota for three months. Defend-ant did not own any
property in Minnesota or conduct any business within
the state. He was permanently registered as a voter in
New York, had a New York license plate on his automo-
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bile, and had his household goods and furniture in New
York. The sheriff attempted substituted service upon
him in Minnesota by handing a copy of the summons
and complaint to his daughter during the period of defendant's visit in her home. The Minnesota Supreme
Court held that the defendant's permanent residence in
New York remained his "usual place of abode," therefore, service at the daughter's residence was invalid.
The majority rule has also been followed by the federal
courts in their interpretation of Rule 4(d) 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which authorizes substituted service by leaving a copy of the process at defendant's dwelling house or "usual place of abode." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 4(d)1. In the case of First National Bank and
Trust Company of Tulsa v. Ingerton, 207 F. 2d 793 (10th
Cir. 1953), defendant maintained residence at a hotel
in New Mexico. Service of process was attempted upon
defendant by leaving a copy of the process with her son
at his house in Denver, Colorado, where defendant had
been visiting for several months. Defendant kept all her
personal effects in the hotel in New Mexico, and left
Denver without returning to her son's house on the day
attempted service of process was made. The United
States Court of Appeals held that service was void because defendant's permanent home, not her temporary
residence, was the "usual place of abode" at the time of
service.
The minority rule is that the "usual place of abode"
means the place where defendant is actually living at
time of service. A leading case expressing this view is
State ex. rel. Merritt v. Heffernan, 142 Fla. 496, 195 So.
145, 127 A. L. R. 1263 (1940). Defendant was a resident
of Minnesota Where he had an office, voted, and paid
taxes. He established his family in an apartment at
Miami Beach, Florida, for the winter season. He joined
them twice during the season, his last visit ending on
the very day substituted service of process was made on
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him at the Florida apartment. In upholding the validity
of the service of process, the Florida Court followed the
rule in Earle v. MoVeigb supra, that "usual place of
abode" means "then present residence." In explaining
its decision, the court quoted from the earlier New Jersey case of Eckman v. Grear,14 N. J. Misc. 807, 187 Atl.
556, 558 (1936):
"... 'usual place of abode' is the place where the
defendant is actually living at the time of the service. The word abode means one's fixed place of residence for the time being when the service is made.
Thus, if a person have several residences, he must be
served at the residence in which he is actually living
at the time service is made." 195 So. at 147.
It seems that the courts have accomplished little in
trying to distinguish between permanent residence and
temporary residence as the "usual place of abode." In
most of the cases both residences could logically be
treated as the "usual place of abode." The important
thing is to determine if defendant had -a reasonable opportunity to learn of the service of process. This is to
insure that defendant is not deprived of due process of
law under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. The requirement for due process is
met if the service of process is reasonably calculated to
give the defendant actual notice of the proceedings and
an opportunity to be heard. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S.
457 (1940). If this requirement is met, then the statute
should be liberally construed so as to validate service.
The Connecticut Supreme Court appears to have adopted
this view.
In Dorws v. Lyov, 92 Conn. 55, 101 Atl. 490 (1917),
defendant leased an apartment in New York City but
continued to spend three days a week at his mother's
home in Connecticut. The Connecticut Supreme Court
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indicated that a man may have a "usual place of abode"
outside the state and may have one within the state at
the same time. In Clegg v. Bishop, 105 Conn. 564, 136
Ati. 102 (1927), defendant and his wife occupied a house
on a Connecticut farm each year from early in April
until about Thanksgiving. The wife remained there for
the entire period, and he from Saturday afternoon to
Monday morning. During the rest of the time defendant
lived in New York. The Connecticut Court stated that
both the Connecticut and New York residences could be
classified -as the "usual place of abode."
The Connecticut view does not appear to be unfair to
a defendant as he has a reasonable opportunity to learn
of the service of process. It will lend more flexibility to
court interpretations of the "usual place of abode" and
reduce needless searches for technical definitions. Plaintiff will have a better opportunity to get his case before
the court to be tried on the merits.
The Spiegelman case indicates that Virginia now follows the majority view that one's permanent residence
remains his "usual place of abode" though he is temporarily residing elsewhere. But the court did not state,
expressly or by implication, that the temporary residence
could not also be the "usual place of abode." The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, therefore, could follow
the liberal Connecticut view and treat both the permanent residence and temporary residence as the "usual
place of abode" without overruling Spiegelman.
JosEPrH L. L~wis

